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Carol Hymowitz, On Diversity, America Isn’t Putting its Money where its Mouth Is,1
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Id. 2
Id.  For more discussion of the shortfalls, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn3
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Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action Employment Litigation and its Effects, 81
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Despite major change in public attitudes about race and gender, and despite
progress for women and minorities in the workplace, . . . there remains
considerable work to eliminate discrimination from the workplace completely.
The Gallup Organization, Employee Discrimination in the Workplace 12 (2005), available at
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by Marcia L. McCormick*
I. INTRODUCTION
Employment discrimination laws in the United States have not created full equality in the
workplace. The Wall Street Journal recently reported that men of color and women of all colors
have not only not caught up to white men, but have regressed recently in wages, representation in
management, and representation in jobs in line for promotion to management.  Black women, for1
example, earn sixty-three percent of what white men earn, and Latina women earn only fifty-two
percent of what white men earn.  These differences cannot be explained, or at least explained2
fully, by neutral factors like differences in education or time taken out of the work force.3
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1142979
http://media.gallup.com/government/PDF/Gallup_Discrimination_Report_Final.pdf. 
Hymowitz, supra note 1, at B1.4
Id.5
See Alexandra Kalev et al., Best Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy of6
Corporate Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 589 (2006) (finding that
affirmative action plans in combination with accountability structures for diversity provided the
only consistent improvement in diversity in management).
See Julie Chi-hye Suk, Antidiscrimination Law in the Administrative State, 2006 U. ILL.7
L. REV. 405 (arguing that antidiscrimination law is a mechanism of distributive and not just
corrective justice).
See infra notes ___ - ___ and accompanying text.8
See infra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.9
The specifics of agency design will be addressed in future work.10
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Additionally, the number of women of all colors in corporate officer posts and in the pipeline for
those posts at Fortune 500 companies has fallen in the past two years.  Women of color make up4
just two percent of those corporate officer posts.5
While these figures do represent some change from 1964, and employer practices have
certainly changed since then, full equality requires greater accountability for those who make
employment decisions.  That accountability requires a strong enforcement system, which, in turn,6
requires greater federal involvement in enforcement and a mechanism to publicize the state of the
nation’s workplaces.  This paper proposes taking private sector employment discrimination out7
of the hands of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and creating a new
federal body to take a more direct role in enforcement and regulation. Roles this body could
perform include investigating and issuing fact-finding about the state of individual workplaces,
adjudicating discrimination claims, and promoting good practices and voluntary compliance by
private employers. 
Creating a federal agency to fill this role would remove two of the largest obstacles to
eradicating employment discrimination–which I have labeled the enforcement gap  and the8
secrecy effect –and would foster greater workplace equality. This article is a first step in the9
recharacterization and reconstruction of anti-discrimination enforcement. It seeks to identify the
problem with precision and to make a normative case for stronger federal enforcement.10
With these two foundational issues in mind, I propose removing private sector
discrimination from the EEOC’s enforcement authority and creating a new agency with a
See infra notes ___ - ___ and accompanying text (discussing the enforcement gap).11
E.g. Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that Tenth Amendment prohibited12
Congress from requiring that state and local law enforcement do background checks for gun
purchases); New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (providing that Congress cannot force states
to accept ownership or regulate nuclear waste in a particular way).
See PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: FACING THE CHALLENGE OF TRUTH13
COMMISSIONS 11 (2002).
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significantly different model. There is a need to be filled that individuals cannot accomplish
themselves  and which Congress probably cannot force the states to fill, unless it links the11
obligation with funding.  But the current model, with the EEOC writing compliance guidelines,12
encouraging mediation, and acting as prosecutor occasionally, is not working.
The new agency should move from a prosecutorial/compliance/recommendation-issuing
model that currently exists to a model that provides best practices guidance with accountability
standards and rewards for employers who meet those, and which also functions as a standing fact
finding agency with independent power to investigate and publicize information about the state
of the nation’s workplaces. 
A model that provides this investigation and publicity function might be found in the
truth commission. The truth commission is a concept borrowed from international law, a tool of
transitional justice.  Transitional justice is a theory of how a repressive and illegitimate13
government can move to a legitimate one. A truth commission  is a body established to help
accomplish that transition by researching and reporting on human rights abuses over a certain
period of time in a particular country or in relation to a particular conflict. Truth commissions in
those countries have allowed individuals, relatives, and perpetrators to give evidence of human
rights abuses, providing an official forum for their accounts. In most instances, truth
commissions are also required by their mandate to provide recommendations on steps to prevent
a recurrence of such abuses.
The federal government already uses a similar structure for legislative hearings and for
blue-ribbon commissions, established to react to public crises. Those hearings serve information
gathering, fact-finding, recommending, and publicizing functions. The 9-11 Commission even
adjudicated claims and distributed compensation from a fund to victims of the September 11
terrorist attacks. Investigating and issuing reports is also the way that the United States Civil
Rights Commission functions. I propose to take the concept of those existing structures one step
further to focus on more disputes in a more narrow area.
Using that fact-finding, recommending, and publicizing structure as the model, the new
agency could perform the information disseminating function necessary to enforcement, and
could also participate in more effectively promoting best practices. While models exist for these
Employment statutes and cases presume that employers retain the discretion to manage14
their businesses and at least part of their business is in deciding whom to hire, what to have
employees do, how much to pay them, how to treat them, and how, when, and why to discharge
them.  See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947,
953-58 (1984) (grounding the practical and theoretical principles underlying the at-will
presumption in employment relationships in a combination of contract and property principles,
both of which are most often economic subjects). This economic grounding is evident in the
language of labor cases especially. For example,
[the employee] surrenders his labor as a whole, and in return receives a
compensation package . . . . Looking at the economic realities, it seems clear that
an employee is selling his labor primarily  to obtain a livelihood, not making an
investment.
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 560 (1979) (considering whether a union trustee
for a pension plan could be liable for securities fraud).
The right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he deems proper is, in its
essence, the same as the right of the purchaser of labor or prescribe the conditions
upon which he will accept such labor from the person offering to sell it.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 102 (1937).
In employment discrimination cases, the economic justification is conveyed by the
common exhortation that courts do not sit as super-personnel boards, second guessing the
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functions, this agency would have broader responsibilities, which would warrant significant
modification, and those modifications are things future papers will explore. To that end, Part II
outlines the enforcement scheme of employment discrimination laws and elaborates on the gaps
in that scheme. It also describes the EEOC, both as it has historically worked and its current
strategy. Part III proposes a new role for a federal agency and outlines its potential functions.
II. ENFORCEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS
The current legal landscape regulating the employment relationship is guided by
principles in serious tension with one another. Courts, legislatures, many scholars, many
employers, and at least some employees view the employment relationship primarily as an
economic one and a private one, but courts and legislatures have also provided employees with
certain rights, the most well-known of which are the antidiscrimination laws. They operate as
external limitations on how that economic and private relationship can be structured. These laws
also serve to provide the public goods of justice and greater equality. These external limitations,
however, are always in some tension with the economic principle of laissez-faire and the privacy
principle. And that tension grows the more a relationship is seen as essentially economic and
private and the less consensus there is on the substance or legitimacy of the external limitation.
Employment discrimination is an area in which both of these principles are true.
The employment relationship is viewed by the law first and foremost as an economic one,
to be left to the self-regulation of the marketplace.  Despite the language of “self-regulation,”14
employer’s business decisions. See Charles A. Sullivan, Circling Back to the Obvious: The
Convergence of Traditional and Reverse Discrimination in Title VII Proof, 46 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1031, 1115-16 & n. 337 (2004) (documenting the hundreds of cases that recite this general
principle).
See GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 44 (2d ed. 1971) (arguing that15
discrimination is economically inefficient).
Some may disagree with this characterization of social security. Since at least the 1980s,16
calls for reform have urged privatization of these benefits on the grounds that the market can
better provide them. Those calls have been adopted by President George W. Bush, who has
advocated partial privatization. E.g., Exec. Order 13210, 66 Fed. Reg. 22,895 (May 2, 2001)
(appointing a sixteen-member Commission to Strengthen Social Security with the mandate that
“modernization must include individually controlled, voluntary personal retirement accounts”). 
See David L. Rose, Twenty-Five Years Later: Where Do We Stand on Equal17
Employment Opportunity Law Enforcement, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1121, 1130-31 (1989) (outlining
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leaving something to the marketplace in the United States does not leave the government neutral
or absent from that relationship. Rather the power of the state is aligned with the holders of
capital, protecting their right to control their property. This alignment is modified slightly by the
labor laws, which align the power of the state with workers in some instances to allow those
workers to leverage their bargaining power. But the core justifications of labor law remain
economic. Thus, the labor laws create relatively less tension when they are enforced. 
Conversely, the imposition of substantive rules, rules that frustrate the operation of the
market or invade the autonomy of the parties, can create significant doctrinal and practical
tension. In theory, if the employment relationship is simply an economic one, then the market
should be able to regulate all aspects of employment by itself, and the efficient outcome will be
the just outcome.  Limitations are not only unnecessary, but are also unjust. Additionally,15
individuals should be allowed to structure the relationships that best work for themselves in order
to maximize personal utility. Limitations on the operation of the market or autonomy of the
parties run counter to core Western notions of liberty and autonomy.
Some of the substantive rules imposed on the employment relationship, like social
security,  workers’ compensation, unemployment insurance, and occupational safety and health,16
have an explicit economic justification, and the tension is less. In other words, those substantive
rules that are commonly seen to guard against failures in the market or to enhance the efficiency
of the market all to protect the public interest will not create so much tension. Likewise, the more
consensus about the need for those limitations, the less the inherent tension will manifest.
Anti-discrimination laws are not grounded in economics, however. They may have an
economic justification, but that has not been the common understanding of their function.  Anti-17
the economic arguments advanced in favor of Title VII but noting that those who advanced that
argument concluded by saying that despite the economic justification, prohibiting discrimination
in employment was “the right thing to do” and an inalienable right); see also Jacob Gersen,
Markets and Discrimination 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. ___ ( forthcoming 2007) (outlining the law and
economics analyses of the extent of employment discrimination and the potential forces driving
it).
See Anthony S. Chen, The Party of Lincoln and the Politics of State Fair Employment18
Practice Legislation in the North, 1945-64, 112 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 1713 (2007) (studying why
some states adopted fair employment practices laws much more slowly than others and
concluding the slowness was a result of key GOP office holders allied with organized business
and motivated by free-market, anti-regulatory ideology).
E.g., Deborah A. Calloway, St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks: Questioning the Basic19
Assumption, 26 CONN. L. REV. 997, 998 (1994); Marcia L. McCormick, The Allure and Danger
of Practicing Law as Taxonomy, 58 ARK. L. REV. 159 (2005); Michael Selmi, Proving
Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 284
(1997). Robert Belton has argued that at least before Title VII was enacted, employment
discrimination was seen as a moral issue, not a legal one. Belton, supra note 5, at 913-14.
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discrimination laws are instead rights based. And being rights based, rather than economically
grounded, anti-discrimination laws create significant tension with the economic model.18
Additionally, to exacerbate this tension, insufficient consensus exists on the scope of the right to
be free from discrimination.
Equality in its broadest terms is a core value to U.S. society, but the meaning of equality
is not quite so settled. Most people agree that those who are the same should be treated the same
and that those who are different should be treated differently. Most also agree that in many cases
characteristics of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, and disability do not make a
person different in a way that matters. Thus, a fairly strong consensus exists that employers
should not be able to discriminate on these bases. However, as I and others have argued, people
currently do not agree on what practices constitute discrimination or how widespread
discrimination is, and therefore the scope and substance of the antidiscrimination right lacks an
undergirding of social consensus.19
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000) (prohibiting racial discrimination in contracts).20
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (2000) (enforcement authority codified at 42 U.S.C.21
§§ 2000e-4, e-5, e-12) (2000)).
29 U.S.C. §§ 206(d), 209, 211, 213, 215-19, 255-56, 259-60, 262 (2000).22
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2000) (enforcement authority codified at 29 U.S.C. § 628 (2000)).23
42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-17 (2000) (enforcement authority codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12111624
(2000)).
29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794, 794a (2000) (enforcement authority codified at 29 U.S.C. §25
794(a)(1) (2000)).
29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (2000).26
29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000) (prohibiting different pay for the same work when that27
difference is because of sex under the Equal Pay Act); 29 U.S.C. 623 (2000) (barring decisions
made on the basis of age as made about a person forty years old or older); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)
(2000) (prohibiting discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities by anyone
receiving federal funding); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000) (prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of race, color, national origin, religion, and sex); 42 U.S.C § 12112 (2000) (prohibiting
discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities).
The FMLA is couched in anti-discrimination terms, in part. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2000); see
Nevada Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 & n.2 (2003). However, rather than
simply outlaw discrimination against those who need to take family leave, the FMLA requires
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Without broad consensus on the scope or substance of the right, the tension between the
rights model and the economic basis of the employment relationship is large. When it comes to
enforcement, this tension creates serious practical difficulties and doctrinal incoherence. The
sections that follow lay out the enforcement model in place and the gaps in enforcement that have
resulted.
A. The Enforcement Model in Place
The main employment discrimination statutes include section 1981,  Title VII of the20
Civil Rights Act of 1964,  the Equal Pay Act,  the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,21 22 23
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act,  sections 501 and 505 of the Rehabilitation Act of24
1973,  and the Family Medical Leave Act.  25 26
Most of these follow the same model. They prohibit employers from taking action to
harm an employee when those actions are motivated by the employee’s status as a member of a
protected group.  Most also prohibit actions taken for a neutral reason but that affect members of27
that employers allow all employees, regardless of gender, up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave for
their own serious health issue, or that of a close family member or for the birth or adoption of a
child. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2000).
Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005) (recognizing disparate impact under the28
ADEA); Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 50 (2003) (holding that disparate impact
claims were cognizable under the ADA); Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 296-300 (1985)
(holding that some form of disparate impact claims were cognizable under Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971) (recognizing
disparate impact under Title VII). The structure of the FMLA, mandating that leave be provided,
might be seen as a way to avoid the disparate impact on women that caretaking responsibilities
often provide. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 728-30.
29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2000) (containing the anti-retaliation provision for the Equal Pay29
Act); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2000) (containing the anti-retaliation provision for the ADEA); 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2000) (prohibiting retaliation under Title VII); 42 U.S.C. § 12203 (2000)
(prohibiting retaliation and coercion under the ADA). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act has
been interpreted to prohibit retaliation. E.g. Gribcheck v. Runyon, 245 F.3d 547, 550 (6th Cir.
2001); Sherman v. Runyon 235 F.3d 406 (8th Cir. 2000). The Supreme Court is currently
considering whether a cause of action for retaliation exists under section 1981. CBOCS West,
Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 30 (2007) (granting certiorari).
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000) (providing for damages, equitable relief, and attorneys’ fees30
under the Equal Pay Act); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2000) (providing for attorneys fees for
violations of Title VII).
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964); see also David L. Rose, Twenty-Five Years31
Later: Where Do We Stand on Equal Employment Opportunity Law Enforcement, 42 VAND. L.
REV. 1121, 1134 (1989). In 1972, it was given the power to bring causes of action against
8
a protected group disproportionately.  They further prohibit employers from retaliating against28
employees who seek the protection of the statutes or who help others seek that protection.  In29
addition to the similarity in protections, these statutes allow employees to sue the employer and
to get damages, equitable relief, and attorneys fees for violations of the statutes.  30
Because the actions prohibited and the remedies provided are similar, these statutes also
provide similar enforcement schemes. All but section 1981 are enforced in part by a federal
administrative agency. For all of the remaining statutes except for the Family Medical Leave Act,
that enforcement agency is the EEOC. 
Originally, the EEOC was empowered only to provide technical assistance, to investigate,
and to attempt conciliation; it could not prosecute charges of discrimination and could not adopt
substantive interpretive regulations.  In 1972, the EEOC was given the power to prosecute31
employers. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103.
Additionally, it was empowered to promulgate substantive regulations under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 9, 81 Stat. 602 (1967), and the
Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 106, 104 Stat. 327 (1990).
But Title VII does create an incentive for employers to comply with EEOC regulations by
providing that “no person shall be subject to any liability or punishment for . . . an unlawful
employment practice if [the person acted in] good faith, in conformity with, and in reliance on
any written interpretation or opinion of the Commission.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b) (2000).
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103. The32
EEOC also has the power to adjudicate federal claims, but not adjudicate private sector disputes.
The adjudication of charges in the federal sector is beyond the scope of this paper.
As Michael Selmi has written, “although a plaintiff must file a claim with the agency, it33
is entirely possible that the EEOC will serve no function other than to issue a mandatory right-to-
sue notice, which is akin to requiring a driver to apply for a bridge token in advance.” Michael
Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency’s Role in Employment Discrimination
Law, 57 OHIO ST. L. J. 1, 8 (1996).
29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (2000) (ADEA); 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e)(1) (2000) (Title VII). The34
Equal Pay Act does not require first filing a charge with the EEOC, see 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), but
because there is significant overlap between the Equal Pay Act and Title VII, for situations that
implicate both statutes, the EEOC recommends that parties file charges under both laws within
the timeline, EEOC, Filing a Charge of Employment Discrimination, at
http://eeoc.gov/charge/overview_charge_filing.html (last modified Aug. 13, 2003).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2000). A majority of states impose a shorter period for filing35
with their agencies, though, so the filing deadline is not always extended when a state has its own
agency. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41-1481(A) (2007) (providing a 180-day period); Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 24-34-306 (2006) (providing a six-month period); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-82(e) (2007)
(providing a 180-day period); Del. Cod Ann. Tit. 19 § 712(c)(1) (2007) (limiting filing period to
120 days); Ga. Code Ann. § 45-19-36 (2007) (providing 180-day period); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
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actions in federal court.  For Title VII, it still lacks the power to issue regulations with the force32
of law.
The EEOC acts as something of a gatekeeper, but not a very strong one because nothing
the EEOC does affects an employee’s ability to purse the charge in court; really it is simply a
bureaucratic hurdle for most.  Nonetheless, an employee who has suffered a violation of one of33
the statutes must file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the event  or the employee will34
not be able to file an action in court later. If the charging party’s state has an anti-discrimination
law that covers the situation, the time for filing a charge with the EEOC is increased to 300
days.  After the charge is filed, the EEOC notifies the employer of the charge.  Charges that35 36
368-11 (LexisNexis 2007) (same); 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/7A-102 (LexisNexis 2007)
(same); inc. Code Ann. § 22-9-1-3 (LexisNexis 2007) (same); Iowa Code § 216.15 (2006)
(same); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-1005 (2006) (providing a filing period of six months); Ky. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 344.200 (LexisNexis 2006) (using 180-day filing period); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
51:2257 (2007) (same); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.5, § 4611 (2006) (requiring complaint to be filed
within six months); Md. Ann. Code art. 49B, § 9A (2007) (same); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.075
(2007) (providing a 180-day filing period); Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-501 (2005) (same); N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 354-A:21 (2007) (same); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-18 (LexisNexis 2007); Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.05 (LexisNexis 2007) (giving a six month limitations period); Okla. Stat.
tit. 25 § 1502 (2007) (using 180-day period); Pa. Stat. Ann. § 959 (LexisNexis 2006) (same);
S.C. Code Ann. § 1-13-90 (2006) (same); S.D. Codified Laws § 20-13-31 (2007) (same); Tenn.
Code Ann. § 4-21-302 (2007) (same); Tex. Lab. Code §§ 21.201-21.202 (2007) (same); Utah
Code Ann. § 34A-5-107 (2007) (same); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 49.60.230 (LexisNexis 2007)
(using a six-month period); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-9-106 (2007) (same); 6 Alaska Admin. Code
tit. 6, §30.230 (2008) (providing a 180-day period); Mich. Admin. Code R 37.4(6) (2007)
(same); 22 Va .Admin. Code § 25-10-30 (2007) (same).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2000).36
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT37
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION: ORGANIZING FOR THE FUTURE 13-14 (2003) [hereinafter
ORGANIZING EEOC] 
Id. at 1538
See id.; see also Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the39
EEOC, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1937 (2006).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2000).40
See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(f)(1) (2000) (providing that litigation commences only if “the41
Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable
to the Commission”).
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strongly suggest that the employer has violated the law are marked for priority investigation.  If37
the parties are willing to mediate, investigation is suspended during the mediation process.  The38
charge can also be settled at any point in the investigation process, although settlement between
an employee and employer would not alter the EEOC’s ability to continue to investigate the
employer unless the EEOC joins in the settlement.  If the investigation reveals that39
discrimination has occurred, the EEOC will attempt to conciliate the matter with the employer to
develop a remedy for the discrimination.  If conciliation is successful, the parties will sign a40
settlement agreement, and not proceed to litigation.  If conciliation is not successful, however,41
42 U.S.C.§§ 2000e-5(f)(1), 2000e-6 (2000).42
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2000).43
Id.44
For the ADEA, the time period is any time after sixty days.45
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2000).46
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2000). That action may be brought in federal court. 4247
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (2000). Because state courts usually also have jurisdiction over federal
issues, an action may also be brought in state court if the state lacks its own employment
discrimination statute, or if the state allows its employment discrimination cases to be heard in
the state courts. Howlett v. Rose, 469 U.S. 356 (1990); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). But
see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that the states cannot be forced to hear federal
claims if they don’t provide jurisdiction for parallel state claims)
The Equal Pay Act allows parties to go straight to state or federal court, and does not
require an employee to go to the EEOC first. See 29 U.S.C. §216(b) (2000).
U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TEN-YEAR CHECKUP: HAVE FEDERAL AGENCIES48
RESPONDED TO CIVIL RIGHTS RECOMMENDATIONS: VOL. IV: AN EVALUATION OF THE
DEPARTMENTS OF EDUCATION, HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, AND HOUSING AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT, AND THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 44 (2004)
[hereinafter TEN-YEAR CHECK-UP], available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/10yr04/10yr04.pdf.
EEOC FY-06, supra note 10, at 13-17, 33; ORGANIZING EEOC, supra note 36, at 18-19.49
Part of this outreach effort includes the EEOC’s compliance manual. From 1998 to 2004, the
EEOC issued only two new sections to that manual, and the Civil Rights Commission has
recommended that it complete and issue a full new manual. 10-yr. report, at 46-47. The
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the EEOC may sue, and the employee may intervene.42
Alternatively, the EEOC may close the case and issue a letter notifying the employee of
the right to sue the employer in court.  If the EEOC finds the evidence insufficient to support the43
charge, it will dismiss the charge, but at the same time issue a notice to the employee that the
employee retains the right to sue the employer in court.  If the investigation has not been44
resolved 180 days  after the charge was filed, the employee can request a right to sue letter, and45
the EEOC will issue the letter and stop the investigation.  Once an employee has received notice46
of the right to sue, the employee has ninety days to commence an action.  47
The EEOC has implemented a five-point plan toward enforcement:48
1. proactive prevention, which focuses on education and outreach to both employees and
employers;49
Commission has also criticized the EEOC’s use of informal guidance and its failure to include
guidance on some key types of discrimination. Id. at 48.
EEOC FY-06, supra note 10, at 7.50
ORGANIZING EEOC, supra note 36, at 15.51
Id. at 13-14.52
ORGANIZING EEOC, supra note 36, at 13, 15. Those cases which the EEOC determines53
are priority charges to which it devotes principle investigative and settlement efforts are not
referred for mediation. See id.
EEOC FY-06, supra note 10, at 9; see also EEOC SYSTEMIC REPORT, supra note 10.54
EEOC FY-06, supra note 10, at 9.55
Id. at 9-10.56
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2. proficient resolution, which attempts to resolve charges fairly and efficiently;
3. promotion and expansion of its mediation program;
4. strategic enforcement and litigation, which seeks to focus on systemic cases; and
5. EEOC as a model workplace, which endeavors to have the agency operate under the goals it
would set for the broader workforce.
Two of these points, mediation and strategic litigation, deserve a little more explanation.
The EEOC’s policy encourages parties to mediate their claims, and it is putting significant
resources into its mediation program.  This push to mediate is a relatively recent development.50
In 1991, the EEOC first experimented with mediation in four field offices.  The EEOC fully51
adopted the program, writing a policy statement in 1994 that set forth core principles for
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in antidiscrimination cases. The EEOC continued to expand
its use of mediation, and now about half of all EEOC charges are mediated.  Most of those are52
charges that appear to have merit but require more information before a decision can be made on
those merits.53
The strategic litigation strategy focuses on systemic cases, which it defines as “pattern or
practice, policy and/or class cases where the alleged discrimination has a broad impact on an
industry, profession, company, or geographic location.”  In 2006, the EEOC filed suit in 37054
cases, and more than forty percent of the EEOC’s case load involved multiple employees or
challenged policies that affected a number of employees.  The EEOC obtains some relief in over55
ninety percent of its cases.56
Although the EEOC plays a role in enforcement through its conciliation, mediation, and
The EEOC reports that it resolved almost 16,500 cases in favor of employees in 200657
through mediation, settlement, or consideration for litigation. EEOC FY-06, supra note 10, at 6
(reporting 22.2% of 74,308 resolutions were merit factor resolutions).
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 2006 JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF58
THE UNITED STATES COURTS: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR tbl. C-2A (2007).
The EEOC brings about 350 actions against employers per year. See EEOC FY-06,59
supra note 10, at 6.
ExpectMore.gov, Detailed Information on the Equal Employment Opportunity60
Assessment, Questions/Answers (Detailed Assessment) 2.5 (2006), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/detail/10003914.2006.html.
Mich. Const. art. V, § 29 (creating agency to investigate and adjudicate discrimination61
claims); Alaska Stat. §§ 18.80.110-130 (2006) (providing that agency may function as
investigator, prosecutor, and adjudicator); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41-1481 (2001) (creating role
for agency as investigator and prosecutor); Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 12930(f), (h), 12935, 12963,
12965 (Deering 2007) (providing that agency can be investigator, prosecutor, and adjudicator);
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-305 (2006) (same); Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 46a-54, 56, 82, 84 (2007)
(same); Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, § 712(a)(3), (c) (2007) (creating roles as investigator and
prosecutor); D.C. Code Ann. § 2-1403.04, 1404.02, 1411.03 (LexisNexis 2007) (creating one
agency to investigate and prosecute claims and another to adjudicate); Fla. Stat. § 760.11 (2007)
(providing that agency is investigator and allowing employees to opt for agency adjudication
instead of going to court); Ga. Code Ann. § 45-19-36, 37 (2007) (limiting agency role to
investigator, but providing for cases with reasonable cause to be referred to special masters for
hearings); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 368-3, 13, 14 (empowering agency to serve as investigator,
prosecutor, and adjudicator); Idaho Code Ann. §§ 67-5906 through 5908 (2007) (creating role as
investigator and prosecutor); 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. §§ 5/7A-102, 8A-102 (LexisNexis 2007)
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litigation efforts,  it relies primarily on private parties coming to it to file charges, and then the57
bulk of actions brought in court to enforce the antidiscrimination laws are brought by private
parties. In 2006, over 14,000 suits were brought in federal court, and while that number is lower
than the number of suits brought in prior years,  that number is still forty times the number of58
suits brought by the EEOC.  That number does not capture the number of cases settled before a59
charge was filed or a suit was brought.
The second largest amount of enforcement comes from state and local fair employment
practices agencies (FEPAs), over ninety of them, which handle over 50,000 charges annually.60
Even though the state agencies together handle fewer charges than the EEOC, the workload is
significantly greater for many of the states. Several states have agencies that investigate and
attempt to conciliate charges, much like the EEOC does, and several also adjudicate charges
either as the sole remedy or as an alternative to litigation in court.  Without a single source that 61
(creating one agency to serve as investigator and prosecutor and a second agency to serve as
adjudicator); Inc. Code Ann. § 22-9-1-6 (LexisNexis 2007) (providing a role for the agency as
investigator and adjudicator); Iowa Code §§ 216.5, .15 (2006) (empowering agency to serve as
investigator, prosecutor, and adjudicator); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-1005 (2006); (creating role for
agency as prosecutor and adjudicator); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 344.180, 200, 210 (empowering
agency to serve as investigator and adjudicator); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 51:2235, 2237 (2007)
(providing that agency can be investigator, prosecutor, and adjudicator); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.
5 §§ 4566, 4612, 4613 (2006) (creating role as investigator and prosecutor); Md. Ann. Code art.
49B, §§ 9A, 10, 11 (empowering agency to serve as investigator, prosecutor and adjudicator);
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 151B, §§ 3, 5 (LexisNexis 2007) (same); Mich. Comp. Laws Serv. §
37.2602 (same); Minn. Stat. § 363A.28, 29, 33 (2006) (same); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.075 (2007)
(same); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 49-2-504, 505 (2005) (creating one agency to investigate and
attempt to conciliate and another to adjudicate); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 48-1117 (LexisNexis
2007) (creating roles for agency as investigator and adjudicator); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§
233.150, 170 (LexisNexis 2007) (same); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 354-A:5, 21 (same); N.J. Stat.
Ann. §§ 10:5-8, 14, 16 (same); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 28-1-4, 10, 11 (empowering agency to
investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate); N.Y. Exec. §§ 295, 297 (Consol. 2007) (same); N.D.
Cent. Code §§ 14-02.4-22, 4-23 (2007) (same); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 4112.04, 05
(LexisNexis 2007) (providing that agency can investigate and adjudicate); Okla. Stat. tit. 25, §
1501-02 (2007) (empowering agency to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate); Or. Rev. Stat. §
659A.825, 835, 845, 850 (2005) (same); Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 957, 959 (LexisNexis 2006) (same);
R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-13, 5.1-6 (2007) (same); S.C. Code Ann. § 1-13-70 (2006) (same); S.D.
Codified Laws §§ 20-13-7, 29, 32, 35 (2007) (creating one agency to investigate and another to
prosecute and adjudicate claims); Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-202 (2007) (empowering agency to
investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate claims); Tex. Lab. Code §§ 21.003, 124, 251 (2007)
(allowing agency to investigate and prosecute claims); Utah Code Ann. § 34A-5-107 (2007)
(creating an agency to investigate and issue relief upon sufficient evidence of discrimination and
a second agency to hold a further hearing on those findings); Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-2634 (2007)
(empowering agency to investigate and adjudicate claims); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 49.60.120
(LexisNexis 2007) (same); W. Va. Code Ann. §§ 5-11-8, 10 (LexisNexis 2007) (empowering
agency to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.39 (LexisNexis 2006)
(creating one agency to investigate and another to adjudicate); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-9-104, 106
(2007) (empowering agency to investigate and adjudicate).
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collects information on FEPAs and their activities and with uneven reporting of caseload
statistics, it is difficult to assess how much enforcement state activity is responsible for. This
enforcement model, combining the efforts of state and local FEPAs with the efforts of a federal
agency has left several gaps in enforcement.
B. Gaps in Our Enforcement Model
The system of enforcement of employment discrimination laws has a gap, as is
demonstrated by the lack of workplace equality that still exists. Title VII has not created as much
ALFRED W. BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAW: THE LAW TRANSMISSION SYSTEM AND EQUAL62
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 4 (1993) (arguing that “the effort to ameliorate long standing
patterns of race and sex subordination [through Title VII] is perhaps the most ambitious social
reform effort ever undertaken in America” (emphasis in original)); see also supra note 1.
Rose, supra note 9, at 1134.63
Id. Some of these agencies even had full cease and desist power. Belton, supra note 5, at64
913 (stating that even with this power, states did not use it effectively).
Id.65
Joseph P. Witherspoon, Civil Rights Policy in the Federal System: Proposals for a66
Better Use of Administrative Process, 74 YALE L.J. 1171, 1172 (1964) (stating that Congress and
the public expected civil rights to be enforced primarily at the state and local level and expected
Title VII to operate primarily in the Southern states which had not challenged the violation of
civil rights, citing as support for this proposition S. Rep. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 2
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2368 (1964)).
Robert Belton, A Comparative Review of Public and Private Enforcement of Title VII of67
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 VAND. L. REV. 905 (1978); see also EEOC v. Assoc. Dry Goods
Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 603 n.21 (1981); Nantiya Ruan, Bringing Sense to Incentives: An
Examination of Incentive Payments to Named Plaintiffs in Employment Discrimination Class
Actions, 10 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 395, 400-01 (2006).
For example, Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi do not prohibit discrimination by68
private employers, except that Mississippi prohibits discrimination on the basis of military status
and in all three at least some public sector employees are protected; in Alabama, only employees
of the legislature are protected. ALA. CODE §§ 25-1-21 through 29-4-3 (2007); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 45-19-29, 45-19-22, 45-19-28, 34-1-2, 34-5-3 (2007); MISS. CODE ANN.§§ 25-9-149, 33-1-15
(2007).
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social change as supporters had originally hoped.  Although the language of Title VII is62
potentially sweeping, the enforcement scheme has never contained the elements supporters
believed necessary for real change.  Title VII was modeled on fair employment practice laws63
that had been adopted by states, and which had had little effect.  In those states, the laws were64
enforced either by private suits or the state attorney general, which left too much control up to the
political will of the state attorney general and the interpretation of the courts.  Now, the system65
continues to rely primarily on states  and on litigation brought by private parties  to enforce the66 67
law. Not surprising to some, the resulting enforcement is rather weak. First, not all states enforce
the law or the norms underlying it.  Second, even for those states that do have laws prohibiting68
discrimination in the private sector, many of the state systems are considered ineffective, relying
too heavily on either private parties alone or on the state attorney general alone to bring an
Belton, supra note 5, at 918-19.69
See generally Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a70
Rights-Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. Rev. ___ (forthcoming 2008) (thoroughly documenting the
way that the system of private enforcement fails employees), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id-1010181#PaperDownload.
Id. at ____ [unpublished version at 34-36] (citing Jane Adams-Roy & Julian Barling,71
Predicting the Decision to Confront or Report Sexual Harassment, 19 J. ORG. BEHAV. 329, 334
(1998) (finding that women who reported sexual harassment internally through formal channels
suffered more negative outcomes than did those who did nothing); Theresa M. Beiner, Using
Evidence of Women’s Stories in Sexual Harassment Cases, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV.
117, 124-25 (2001) (“Many plaintiffs’ lawyers would tell you that once an
employee complains about discrimination on the job, he or she can usually consider that
employment relationship over.”); Mindy E. Bergman et al., The (Un)reasonableness of
Reporting: Antecedents and Consequences of Reporting Sexual Harassment, 87 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 230 (2002) (describing a study which found that despite women’s subjective views
that reporting harassment improved their situation, empirical outcomes demonstrated that the
women suffered adverse consequences); Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1,
32-42 (2005) (describing studies of retaliation); Matthew S. Hesson-McInnis & Louise F.
Fitzgerald, Sexual Harassment: A Preliminary Test of an Integrative Model, 27 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 877, 896 (1997) (“[A]ssertive and formal responses were actually associated with
more negative outcomes of every sort.”); Shereen G. Bingham & Lisa L. Scherer, Factors
Associated with Responses to Sexual Harassment and Satisfaction with Outcome, 29 SEX ROLES
239, 247-48 (1993) (same)).
TERRY PRATCHETT, WYRD SISTERS 235 (1988) (1st ROC prtg. 1990).72
Brake & Grossman, supra note 70, at ___ [unpublished version at 34-36]; Ruan, supra73
note 5, at 397, 410-11 (detailing risks like retaliation, ostracization, and blacklisting within an
industry); see also infra notes ____, detailing the extent of workplaces that use pre-dispute
arbitration or other forms of ADR.
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action.69
Private enforcement through litigation is also not as effective as we might hope, for a
number of reasons.  The danger of retaliation or being blacklisted within an industry places70
practical limitations on workers’ ability to challenge the actions of current or even past
employers.  As a practical matter, “[o]nly in our dreams are we free. The rest of the time we71
need wages.”  Additionally, many employees do not know their rights, lack resources to72
vindicate them or to attract representation to help vindicate them, or are subject to agreements to
submit any disputes to ADR.  The system of enforcement does not compensate for this lack of73
power in employees. 
Comments of Ronnie Blumenthal, in EEOC, Making Right a Reality,74
http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/35th/voices/making.html (containing excerpted quotes from 20-
year veterans of the EEOC from EEOC, MAKING A RIGHT A REALITY: AN ORAL HISTORY OF
THE EARLY YEARS OF THE EEOC, 1965 - 72 (1998)).
Comments of Donald Hollowell, in EEOC, supra note 74.75
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, FISCAL YEAR 200676
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 9 (2006) [hereinafter EEOC FY-06] (detailing its
strategic litigation agenda), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/plan/par/2006/par2006.pdf; see also EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION SYSTEMIC TASK FORCE, SYSTEMIC TASK FORCE REPORT TO THE
CHAIR OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (2006) [hereinafter EEOC
SYSTEMIC REPORT], available at http://eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/task_reports/systemic.pdf. 
Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson/Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).77
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As mentioned above, the EEOC was one mechanism created to supplement the
enforcement of states and individuals, and its most powerful weapon is litigation:
[T]he most dramatic shift [in the power of the EEOC] was in 1972 when we got
the litigation authority. You changed the whole orientation mission of the agency
which was up until then the investigation and conciliation of charges of
employment discrimination. Investigation- conciliation remained, but you had an
enormous club that you could walk into federal district court with. And we could
do it ourselves and didn't have to rely on the private bar...It was the force of the
United States of America, and I think what made us more conscious of it was the
caliber of people recruited crackerjack trial lawyers and crackerjack appellate
lawyers with many years of experience.74
. . .
Oh, no question about it [The power to litigate] gave this agency substantially
more teeth. In the first place, just the growl itself was effective from time to time,
just the fact that you were able to go to court got some positive effects.75
 
However, the agency lacks the resources to bring suits in every meritorious case and therefore
chooses to get involved only in cases involving more than one employee or which could lead to a
change in policies for a number of employees.  More and a different type of federal involvement76
is needed for effective enforcement and accountability.
Another obstacle to ending discrimination, related to the enforcement gap is the secrecy
effect. The secrecy effect is caused by the ability of litigants to hide information about claims of
discrimination through alternative forms of dispute resolution. Since the Supreme Court held that
employers could require employees to arbitrate their statutory rights,  growing numbers of77
employers have required as a condition of employment that employees sign pre-dispute
EEOC NOTICE NO. 915.002: POLICY STATEMENT ON MANDATORY BINDING78
ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION DISPUTES AS A CONDITION OF EMPLOYMENT
(1997), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/mandarb.html. Several studies have been
conducted to try to gauge how many businesses have adopted mandatory arbitration. Those
surveys reflected that by the late 1990s and early 2000s, approximately fifteen percent of
companies had adopted mandatory arbitration. Alexander J.S. Colvin, From Supreme Court to
Shopfloor: Mandatory Arbitration and the Reconfiguration of Workplace Dispute Resolution, 13
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 581, 586-88 (2004) (reporting on several surveys); see also
KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS 189 (2004) (noting that as of 2004, the
number of employees covered by mandatory arbitration agreements equalled the number covered
by collective bargaining agreements). The United States General Accounting Office did a survey
in the mid 1990s that suggested almost all firms with 100 or more employees used some method
of ADR. U.S. GAO, GAO/HEHS 95-150, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: MOST PRIVATE
SECTOR EMPLOYERS USE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 6 (1995) (reporting that while
only about ten percent of these employers used arbitration, almost ninety percent used some form
of ADR). And the larger the company, the more likely it is to have used arbitration. Michael H.
LeRoy, Getting Nothing for Something: When Women Prevail in Employment Arbitration
Awards, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 573, 578 n.22 (2005) (citing Alternative Dispute Resolution:
Most Large Employers Prefer ADR as Alternative to Litigation, Survey Says, DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) No. 93, at A4 (May 14, 1997)).The use of arbitration has increased since the late 1990s.
See Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Claims: An Empirical
Comparison, 58 DISPUTE RES. J. 44 (Jan. 2004). In his most recent article, Alexander Colvin
suggests that nearly one quarter of the workforce is covered by pre-dispute arbitration
agreements. Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity
amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405, 411 (2007) [hereinafter Colvin,
Empirical Research].
Suk, supra note 3, at 414-15.79
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arbitration agreements, agreeing to submit all disputes to arbitration and waiving the right to go
to court.  Aside from arbitration, other forms of ADR, such as mediation and internal dispute78
resolution, grow in popularity. All of these forms of ADR operate in a private system, hidden
from the public.
A private system of dispute resolution would not be so problematic if the only interests at
stake were the interests of employer and employee. This is simply not the case. Discrimination is
a private harm, in that the individual subject to discrimination is injured, but it is also a public
harm. An action taken because of a person’s group status affects everyone in that group both in a
corrective sense of injury and stigma, but also in a distributive sense by limiting access to social
goods.  Thus, discrimination affects the public in a way that truly individual disputes do not. 79
Because of the public harm caused by discrimination, the public has an interest in
knowing the extent of allegations of discrimination, knowing the information that a trial makes
See Susan Sturm & Howard Gadlin, Conflict Resolution and Systemic Change, 2007 J.80
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 1, 3.
But see generally id.81
Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work in Constitutional Perspective, 8282
CORNELL L. REV. 523, 532 (1997).
ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN83
PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR, at xiv-xvii (1995) (documenting the market revolution); Karst,
supra note 64, at 532.
NIELSEN, CONSUMER CONFIDENCE, CONCERNS & SPENDING INTENTIONS: A GLOBAL84
NIELSEN CONSUMER REPORT 5 (July 2007), available at
http://us.nielsen.com/news/20050613.shtml
(reporting that 23% of U.S. consumers say they have no money left once they have covered their
essential living expenses);CareerBuilder.com, Four-in-Ten Workers Live Paycheck to Paycheck,
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public, and knowing how the law is being interpreted. This knowledge is necessary to determine
whether the distribution of employment opportunity is truly a just distribution. Moreover,
although one function of adjudication is to settle disputes, another function of adjudication is to
develop and publicize norms to help people conform their conduct to those norms.  If80
information about discrimination can be hidden from the public, the system cannot serve this
norm expressing function.81
Thus, the current model of enforcement has an enforcement gap and a secrecy gap caused
by three main factors. First, private suits cannot effectively and fully enforce Title VII because of
the dependence of individuals on employment to live and the resulting power that gives
employers. Second, private dispute resolution cannot vindicate public harms. And third, the
EEOC itself is ineffective and in fact contributes to the problem of secrecy.
1. Limitations on the Ability of Private Parties 
to Fully Enforce Employment Discrimination Laws
Although this was not always the case, working for wages is the primary way that most of
us support ourselves.  In other words, while at the founding of this country, most people were82
self-sufficient, growing much of their own food, making many of their own goods, and trading
for the rest rather than working for someone else for wages, at least since World War II, almost
no one continues to be self-sufficient, and the vast majority of people work for someone else.83
Thus, the vast majority of Americans depend on wages and employers to live. 
In addition to this baseline level of dependence, according to survey data, twenty to forty
percent of workers say that they live paycheck to paycheck.  At the same time, only thirty-seven84
According to CarrerBuilder.com Survey (Mar. 12, 2007),
http://www.careerbuilder.com/share/aboutus/pressreleasesdetail.aspx?id=pr357&sd=3/12/2007&
ed=12/31/2007 (reporting that 40% say they live paycheck to paycheck and 20% of those who
make $100,000 or more say so).
NIELSEN, supra note 66, at 5 (reporting this figure for the U.S. and Canada together).85
The EEOC’s website indicates that in fiscal year 2007, 26,663 retaliation charges were86
filed, up 18 percent from the prior year, which is twice the rate at which charges generally rose.
EEOC, Job Bias Charges Rise 9% in 2007, EEOC Reports (Mar. 5, 2008),
http://eeoc.gov/press/3-5-08.html.
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006).87
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percent of consumers save or invest money for the future.  If that means that sixty-three percent85
of consumers have little or no savings, then it is fair to assume that the majority of American
workers can ill afford to go without a paycheck for very long even if those workers are not quite
living paycheck to paycheck. Only a minority of Americans is able to risk losing a job without
another one to go to. A large number of people, then, are wholly dependent on the goodwill (or
lack of ill will) of employers. This dependence means that not many employees are able as a
practical matter to risk the displeasure of their employers, and filing a charge of discrimination or
even complaining within the company of discriminatory treatment is likely to displease an
employer.
Some might argue that because Title VII and the other employment discrimination laws
prohibit retaliation against those who file charges with the EEOC or who complain internally
about discrimination, there is no risk to the employee of losing a job (if the employee has not
been terminated) or of being blacklisted by other employers (if the employee has been terminated
or has quit and is seeking other work). However, despite these protections, some risk remains, as
is demonstrated by the rise in charges of retaliation filed with the EEOC to record levels.  First,86
it can be difficult to prove that the employer’s motive was retaliation, since proving a person’s
state of mind is often difficult. The state of mind is not itself observable but can only be inferred
from the statements and actions of the actor, which are often capable of more than one
interpretation. Second, the form that retaliation can take must be enough that it would deter a
reasonable employee from objecting to the discrimination or filing a charge.  Evaluating whether87
one is acting like a reasonable employee can be challenging when one is in the middle of a
dispute. Third, even if an employee can prove motive and can prove that the employer’s action
would deter a reasonable employee, it is not clear what the employee has to prove about the
underlying discrimination in order to state a retaliation claim. In other words, there is a split in
the circuits about whether in order to state a valid claim of retaliation, the facts giving rise to the
underlying discrimination must be sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, or whether simply a
See Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001) (assuming without holding88
that plaintiff would have to show both a good faith belief that conduct amounted to unlawful
discrimination and that the belief was objectively reasonable).
See Crawford v. Metropolitan Gov’t of Nashville, 99 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 43889
(6th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3391 (2008).
Cheryl R. Kaiser & Brenda Major, A Social Psychological Perspective on Perceiving90
and Reporting Discrimination, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 801, 818 (2006).
Id. at 818-19.91
Id. at 804-06. Some people also interpret ambiguous events as discriminatory, but that is92
not as common as people often think. Id. at 803-04, 824-25.
Id. at 824.93
KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF94
VICTIMS 26-30 (1992) (reporting on a 1980 study by the Civil Litigation Research Project).
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good faith belief that the conduct violated the law is enough.  And fourth, while it is clear that88
activities like filing a charge or complying with an investigation by the EEOC will be protected,
it is less clear what kinds of activities not in connection with a charge filed with the EEOC will
be protected from retaliation.89
Furthermore, even if the risk of retaliation were small, that risk will suffice to deter some
employees from pursuing valid claims.  Even if the employee could win a claim of retaliation, if90
the employee can’t risk being out of work, the employee won’t take the risk of doing anything
that could potentially lead to retaliation. Additionally, the employee’s fear of retaliation is
rational. Social science research demonstrates that complaining of discrimination backfires on
those who complain. Those who complain that they have been discriminated against are
perceived by others negatively even when the perceiver knows that the complaint is true, that is
even when the person who hears the complaint of discrimination knows that the person actually
was discriminated against.  And so making a claim of discrimination is an inherently risky act,91
and that fact will reasonably deter employees from making meritorious claims. To compound
that, many employees may not know their rights or may not know or want to admit that they have
been discriminated against; as social psychologists have demonstrated, many people do not
accurately perceive when they have been discriminated against.  Finally, discrimination is92
difficult to detect from an individual incident. It can be subtle or heavily coded, and it will be
particularly hard to detect by people who believe strongly that society is on the whole fair and
legitimate.  93
Outside of the limitations on individuals themselves, employees face significant external
hurdles in litigation. In fact, scholars have documented how few cases are brought,  how few94
 E.g. Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment95
Cases, 34 Wake Forest L. Rev. 71, 120 n.330 (1999) (suggesting that only ten percent of
employment discrimination cases go to trial); Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How
Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 429,
440-41, 444 (2004) (suggesting that seventy percent of employment discrimination cases settle
and plaintiffs win only just over four percent of pretrial adjudications).
Kevin M. Clermont et al., How Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the96
Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMP RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 547, 556-58, 566
(2003) (finding that cases decided in favor of plaintiffs are four times more likely to be reversed
than those found in favor of defendants); Selmi, supra note 36, at 283-84, 309 (arguing that
meritorious cases are lost or reversed on appeal); Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment
Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 558, 560-61 (2001) (asserting that
employers prevail in 98 percent of federal court employment discrimination cases resolved at the
pretrial stage). 
Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action Employment97
Litigation and its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV.1249 (2003) (documenting how class actions fail to
affect shareholder price or real management change in most cases).
Kaiser & Major, supra note 71, at 824; see also Selmi, supra note 76, at 556-57, 561-98
71.
Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert L. Nelson, & Ryon Lancaster, Uncertain Justice: Litigating99
Claims of Employment Discrimination in the Contemporary United States (2008), available at
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cases go to trial,  how few cases are resolved in favor of employees,  and how little private class95 96
actions seem to affect company practices.  Part of the reason for this is the implicit biases of the97
decision makers. For example, individuals predict that if they were to experience discrimination,
they would confront the discriminator or report the matter to a supervisor, but when those same
people are actually faced with discrimination, most do not do those things; still those people hold
others to that higher standard, not realizing that even they cannot live up to it, and are suspicious
when only one employee complains.  98
For all of these reasons, relying primarily on lawsuits brought by individuals is a poor
way to enforce the laws prohibiting employment discrimination. It requires that individuals
recognize that they have been discriminated against, that all who have been discriminated against
speak out by bringing formal legal proceedings, and that investigators, judges, and jurors
understand their own implicit biases against those who complain of discrimination and the
complex nature of the employee’s perception of the conduct in the first place. 
This critique is supported by a recent study by Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert L. Nelson, and
Ryon Lancaster for the American Bar Foundation.  Using a large random sampling of99
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1093313.
Id. at 1, 9-11, 13-18.100
Id. at 31.101
Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV.102
L. REV. 668, 668 (1986).
Colvin, Empirical Research, supra note 11, at 411 (extrapolating from studies a figure103
of between fifteen and twenty-five percent). The unionization rate in 2006 was only twelve
percent, and so more employees are covered by these agreements that collective bargaining
arbitration systems. Id. (citing U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Bureau of Labor Statistics, MLR: The Editor’s
Desk: Union Membership in 2006 (2007), available at
<http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2007/jan/wk4/art05.htm>.
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-95-150, EMPLOYMENT104
DISCRIMINATION: MOST PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYERS USE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTIONS 7 (1995) (reporting that about forty-five percent of employers that had more than
100 employees used internal or external mediation). About sixty-four percent of the workforce is
employed by employers this size or larger. See U.S. Census Bureau, Number of Firms, Number
of Establishments, Employment, and Annual Payroll by Employment Size of the Enterprise for
the United States and States, Totals (2005) (Company Statistics: Profiling U.S. Businesses,
Tabulations by Enterprise Size, at http://www.census.gov/csd/susb/susb05.htm, select U.S. and
all states totals link to download the figures from which this number is calculated).
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employment discrimination cases filed between 1988 and 2003, the authors studied the resolution
of those cases, accounting for the stage of litigation at which they were resolved in addition to the
substantive outcome.  The authors concluded that litigation seldom provided a mechanism for100
systemic reform or provided a meaningful remedy for individuals.  101
2. The Problem of ADR
Relying on litigation as the primary means to enforce the law is also problematic.
Litigation brings with it methods of ADR. Methods of alternative dispute regulation were
developed as alternatives to litigation and had become a popular choice for litigants with fairly
wide use by the mid-1980s.  They are attractive to courts and litigants because they resolve102
disputes quickly, informally, and less expensively. The main forms of ADR used in the
employment discrimination context are mandatory binding arbitration and mediation. Now,
nearly one quarter of the workforce is covered by pre-dispute arbitration agreements,  and a103
large number are covered by some kind of internal or external mediation.  Even more workers104
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 81, at 2, 7 (reporting that 74.2% of105
employers that had more than 100 employees used a process that allowed the employee to discuss
a complaint with a senior manager without fear of reprisal, that 80.6% of these employees used
either a neutral party within or external to the company to investigate complaints and develop
findings that may provide a basis for resolution, and that 19.9% used peer review committees of
employees or an employee/management mix to resolve complaints).
Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in106
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359; Richard Delgado, ADR and the
Dispossessed: Recent Books about the Deformalization Movement, 13 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 145
(1988).
These critiques do not apply with equal force in the context of collective bargaining,107
where the workers organized have significantly more power in relation to the employer than
individual employees do.
Alfred W. Blumrosen, Exploring Voluntary Arbitration of Individual Employment108
Disputes, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 249, 254-55 (1983); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or
Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74
WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 682-83 (1996).
Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims: Rights “Waived” and Lost in the109
Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 381, 403, 426 (1996); Julius G. Getman, Labor
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are covered by internal dispute resolution programs.105
ADR in the employment discrimination context is not like ADR between parties at arms
length and represented by counsel. First, employers usually have unilateral power to require
employees to agree to ADR methods and unilateral power to craft the agreements. Employees
very rarely are represented by counsel either at the point of entering the agreement or during the
dispute resolution processes. 
ADR may not serve the disempowered well for a number of reasons, all of which are
related to the power of employers and dependence of employees.  Mandatory arbitration–which106
employees are required as a condition of employment to agree to before any dispute has
arisen–has been widely critiqued as a method of resolving statutory claims.  Employees have no107
real power to bargain over the terms of the agreement, and may not realize what they are giving
up by agreeing. Employers thus have more power to draft agreements in ways that systematically
disempower employees.108
Employers may be favored by the processes of arbitration as well. Employers are repeat
players in arbitration, which may either make arbitrators less neutral or may make it difficult for
employees to accurately assess neutrality.  Additionally, arbitrators need not decide the dispute109
Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916, 936 (1979); Robert A. Gorman, The
Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration of Public-Law Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 635,
656; Lewis Maltby, Paradise Lost–How the Gilmer Court Lost the Opportunity for Alternative
Dispute Resolution to Improve Civil Rights, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 4-5 (1994);
Sternlight, supra note 85, at 685-86.
Cf. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure110
of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 789-93 (1984) (arguing that this frees the parties to
reach more creative solutions).
The informality of the rules of evidence may also benefit employees, though.111
Employees without any legal background are much less likely than attorneys for employers or
even non-attorney employer representatives to understand how to present material to the
decisionmaker within those rules.
E.g. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2000) (providing for vacatur where (1) “the award was procured112
by corruption, fraud or undue means;” (2) where “there was evident partiality or
corruption in the arbitrators;” (3) where “the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct,” e.g., by
refusing to postpone the hearing for good cause shown or by refusing to consider material and
pertinent evidence; and (4) where “the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a . . . final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made.”). At the same time, the Supreme Court in Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson/Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20, 28 (1991), relied on the due process protections present in the agreement at issue in that
case in upholding arbitration of statutory employment discrimination claims. And courts have
refused to enforce arbitration agreements that fail to meet minimum due process protections. For
a good summary of applicable case law and industry self-regulation, see Martin H. Malin, Due
Process in Employment Arbitration: The State of the Law and the Need for Self-Regulation, 11
EMP. L. & EMP. POL’Y J. 363 (2007). 
The National Association of Securities Dealers, the group at issue in the Gilmer113
decision does keep record. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Uniform Code of Arbitration Procedure §
10326(a) (governing cases filed before April 2007), available at
http://finra.complinet.com/finra/display/display.html?rbid=1189&element_id=1159000927. The
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based on substantive law.  Furthermore, rarely is full discovery available, and the rules of110
evidence do not apply during the proceedings. To the extent that these procedural devices help to
correct power imbalances between parties in court,  their absence in arbitration can help to111
solidify that power imbalance.
And there is very little a court can do to correct problems with an arbitration’s processes
after the fact because the standard for setting aside an arbitral award are extremely deferential.112
Review is also impracticable. Arbitration proceedings produce no record unless the parties
provide for it in their arbitration agreement.  Moreover, arbitration often produces no written113
current provisions also provide for a record to be kept. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, NASD Code
of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes § 13606, available at
http://finra.complinet.com/finra/display/display.html?rbid=1189&element_id=1159000927.
Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L.114
REV. 1, 17 (1987); Laura Macklin, Promoting Settlement, Foregoing the Facts, 14 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 575 (1986).
See Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is it Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV.115
1631, 1632-34 (2005) (describing the level of criticism of mandatory arbitration agreements and
their expansive use). 
Colvin, Empirical Research, supra note 11, at 414-19, 423-24.116
Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Dispute Resolution: The Case for Mediation, 22117
CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 145 (2004); Lisa B. Bingham, Is There a Bias in Arbitration of Nonunion
Employment Disputes? An Analysis of Actual Cases and Outcomes, 6 INT’L J. CONFLICT MGMT.
369 (1995); Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth T. Hill, Employment Arbitration and Litigation: An
Empirical Comparison (NYU Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 65, Cornell Law
School Working Paper Mar. 5, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=389780 or DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.389780; Michael H. LeRoy, Getting Nothing for Something: When Women Prevail
in Employment Arbitration Awards, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 573, 576-77, 589 (2005)
(asserting that employees tend to win in arbitration but the value of the award is much less than
what the courts offer); Lewis L. Maltby, Employment Arbitration and Workplace Justice, 38
U.S.F. L. REV. 105 (2003); Lewis L. Maltby, The Myth of Second-Class Justice: Resolving
Employment Disputes in Arbitration, in HOW ADR WORKS 915, 921 (Norman Brand ed., 2002).
E.g., E. PATRICK MCDERMOTT ET AL., EEOC ORDER NO. 9/0900/7632/2, AN118
EVALUATION OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION MEDIATION PROGRAM
(2000), available at <http://www.eeoc.gov/mediate/report/index.html> (reporting results of a
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decision with the reasoning of the arbitrator explained. Arbitrators are usually not required to
issue findings of fact or conclusions of law, and employees may even be required to keep the
results confidential.  114
For all of these reasons, many commentators worry that these agreements allow
employers to escape liability for discrimination.  Some empirical research supports that115
assertion,  while other empirical research suggests that employees win slightly more often in116
arbitration than they do in litigation, but are awarded less in damages.  117
Recently, employers have begun to move away from arbitration and focus more heavily
on mediation, and because mediation is not binding, nor is it formal or as alienating as
adjudication is, employee advocates see this as a positive development.  Mediation is118
study that demonstrates high employee satisfaction with mediation); E. PATRICK MCDERMOTT ET
AL., ORDER NO. 9/0900/7623/G, THE EEOC MEDIATION PROGRAM: MEDIATORS’ PERSPECTIVE
ON THE PARTIES, PROCESSES, AND OUTCOMES (2001), available at
<http://www.eeoc.gov/mediate/mcdfinal.html> (same); D. Hardison Wood & David Mark Leon,
Measuring Value in Mediation: A Case Study of Workplace Mediation in City Government, 21
OHIO J. DISPUTE RESOL. 383 (2006) (reporting high employee satisfaction and better working
conditions as a result of mediation)
Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Use of Mediation to Resolve Criminal Cases: A119
Procedural Critique, 43 EMORY L.J. 1247, 126_ (1994); Harry Mika, The Practice and Prospect
of Victim-Offender Programs, 46 S.M.U. L. REV. 2191, 2195 (1993).
See MCDERMOTT ET AL., EEOC ORDER NO. 9/0900/7632/2, supra note 116;120
MCDERMOTT ET AL., ORDER NO. 9/0900/7623/G, supra note 116; Brent T. White, Say You’re
Sorry: Court Ordered Apologies as a Civil Rights Remedy, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1261 (2006)
(discussing the importance litigants place on an apology aside from or instead of more traditional
relief).
Lauren B. Edelman, Howard S. Erlanger, & John Lande, Internal Dispute Resolution:121
The Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 497 (1993).
JEFFREY Z. RUBIN & BERT R. BROWN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF BARGAINING AND122
NEGOTIATION 198-99, 201-13 (1975).
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sometimes seen as a process of reconciliation, which sounds like a good result for a purely
private dispute.  Mediation is problematic, though still, because settlements can be reached that,119
while they serve the minimum desires of individual employees,  do not vindicate legal rights or120
work structural change. In addition, mediation processes may tend to disempower employees by
not compensating for their relative lack of power. Employees are almost never represented by
counsel in mediation. Moreover, in mediation, where there is no compelled discovery, as
opposed to arbitration where there may be some limited discovery, an employer can maintain a
monopoly on the information about the dispute. Employees are likely not to have counsel, as
well. In addition, studies have demonstrated the way that employer run mediation-style dispute
resolution mechanisms can subvert employees’ claims, reinterpreting them as personality
conflicts and management issues in a way that convinces employees that they have no right at
stake.  Thus, mediation can simply magnify the power differential that already exists in the121
employer/employee relationship.
Mediation is essentially a process of bargaining. However, the patterns of
interdependence in bargaining suggest that bargaining over issues of employment discrimination
is not likely to produce just results because of the disparity of power between employer and
employee.  This power imbalance lends itself to the employer exploiting the situation and the122
Id. at 199, 213-33.123
Id. at 251-55.124
See id. at 130-36, 155 (arguing that intangible issues should be translated into concrete125
dimensions, broken into tangible components, and those components should be negotiated over).
Brunet, supra note 90, at 17.126
Anne S. Kim, Rent-a-Judges and the Cost of Selling Justice, 44 DUKE L.J. 166 (1994).127
As the Supreme Court has stated,128
The disclosure through litigation of incidents or practices which violate national
policies respecting nondiscrimination in the work force is itself important, for the
occurrence of violations may disclose patterns of noncompliance resulting from a
misappreciation of [Title VII's] operation or entrenched resistance to its
commands, either of which can be of industry-wide significance. 
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358-59 (1995).
Melissa Hart, The Possibility of Avoiding Discrimination: Considering Compliance129
and Liability, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1623 (2007).
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employee behaving submissively.  The more that the parties see each other as competitors or123
enemies, the more likely their motivational orientation will move farther into competition,
frustrating the bargaining process.124
Finally, even if these difficulties did not exist in a particular dispute, the problem with
ADR for statutory antidiscrimination issues is that there is always a third party–the public–which
has an interest in the matter but which is not present in the negotiation. Moreover, even if the
public could be represented in a negotiation, the interests of the public tend to be very intangible,
and thus difficult to bargain directly over.125
In fact, regardless of what kind of ADR the parties use, the public is disserved. Dispute
resolution is not the only goal of litigation.  Public rulemaking to give form to legislation is an126
important function that only courts or agencies with power to do so can provide.  Rules can127
only be made through decisions that will bind more than the immediate parties to the dispute. 
ADR does not make rules and in fact hides allegations of wrongdoing from the public eye.128
Employees cannot tell whether they have been discriminated against without a record of cases
developing rules in the area, and employers cannot determine how to avoid liability.  Without129
an understanding of what conduct will lead to liability, employers cannot police themselves to
avoid engaging in the conduct; the ability to detect risks or having a regulatory body able to point
See Stephen Calkins, Corporate Compliance and the Antitrust Agencies’ Bi-Modal130
Penalites, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1997, at 127; John T. Scholz, Enforcement Policy
and Corporate Misconduct: The Changing Perspective of Deterrence Theory, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1997, at 253.
William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millenium: Regulatory Negotiation and the131
Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L.J. 1351 (1997); William Funk, When Smoke Gets in
Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation and the Public Interest–EPA’s Woodstove Standards, 18
ENVTL. L. 55 (1987).
Compare EEOC FY-06, sura note 9, at 7-9 with EEOC NOTICE NO. 915.002: POLICY132
STATEMENT ON MANDATORY BINDING ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
DISPUTES AS A CONDITION OF EMPLOYMENT (July 10, 1997), available at
<http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/mandarb.html (setting a policy opposing arbitration for
statutory discrimination claims).
Id. Title VII provides that “no person shall be subject to any liability or punishment for133
. . . an unlawful employment practice if [the person acted in] good faith, in conformity with, and
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those out changes corporate behavior.130
Even more than this lack of rulemaking, though, there is a special public interest at stake
in employment discrimination cases. The equality norm is a core value of our society. It is the
subject of constitutional provisions and numerous federal and state statutes. Without
transparency, the public cannot see how norms are being developed in this area, and the norms
themselves will stagnate. Additionally, without transparency, the distributive goals of the
antidiscrimination law cannot be met.
Congress recognized the centrality of this value by enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and other antidiscrimination provisions. Moreover, where Congress has created an administrative
agency to oversee enforcement, it has expressed a preference that this law is central to the public
interest and that the federal government should engage in that enforcement. Taking these kinds of
cases out of the hands of that agency through ADR promotes private rather than public
interests.  It is not surprising then that the EEOC opposes arbitration, although it promotes its131
mediation program.132
3. The Ineffectiveness of the EEOC
Compounding the difficulties posed by relying on private litigation, the EEOC is itself
ineffective both because it lacks the resources to fulfill its mission, and also because even if it
were fully funded, the processes used by the EEOC would not fully transform the workplace.
Although the EEOC can issue technical guidance, which gives employers an affirmative defense
if followed,  its lack of power under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act to issue regulations with133
in reliance on any written interpretation or opinion of the Commission.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b)
(2000).
E.g. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) (“Congress, in enacting134
Title VII, did not confer upon the EEOC authority to promulgate rules or regulations,” and thus
the deference courts should give “will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration,
the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those
factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control”); see also Melissa Hart,
Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1937 (2006)
(arguing that the Supreme Court almost never defers to the EEOC even under statutes the EEOC
possesses rulemaking power to enforce). But see Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki, No. 06-
1322 (Feb. 27, 2008) (deferring to the EEOC’s interpretation of what a charge is).
Belton, supra note 5, at 920 (citing U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL135
CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT: TO ELIMINATE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 87-88
(1971).
TEN-YEAR CHECK-UP, supra note 47, at 40. (reporting as well that the EEOC has not136
received between ten and twenty million dollars of the annual funding it has requested, although
its funding went from $242 million in 1998 to $310 million in 2002, and increase of almost $70
million dollars in four years); id. at 42 (reporting that the EEOC did not receive the staffing it
requested); see also Belton, supra note 5, at 920 (citing U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
supra note 113, at 88, which documents the staffing deficiencies from the start of the EEOC’s
existence). The current Chair of the EEOC, Naomi Churchill Earp remarked at the 2008 State of
the Black Union conference the chronic lack of funding and also noted that no Chair since
Eleanor Holmes Norton has had the ear of the President. Naomi Churchill Earp, Chair, EEOC,
Remarks at the State of the Black Union (Feb. 23, 2008) (C-Span television broadcast), available
at
http://www.c-spanarchives.org/library/index.php?main_page=product_video_info&products_id=
204090-1 (at 1:08:52 to 1:15:08).
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the force of law has meant that the courts frequently refuse to defer to its interpretations of the
laws it enforces, making the EEOC particularly toothless.134
Scholars and antidiscrimination activists were concerned that the EEOC would be
ineffective when it was created because the state systems that the EEOC was modeled on had not
been effective. These concerns have been borne out. From the start, the EEOC was behind. Given
a year from the date that Title VII was passed to gather personnel and establish procedures, the
EEOC was not able to begin to prepare until one month before it was to begin enforcement
efforts.  And it seems the EEOC has never recovered from that slow start.135
The EEOC has been limited by the lack of staff, funding, and political support to
accomplish the mission it was charged with.  Most recently, the Commission operated without136
TEN-YEAR CHECK-UP, supra note 47, at 42.137
EEOC FY-06, supra note 10, at 6; see also ORGANIZING EEOC, supra note 36, at 14138
(setting charge numbers in prior years closer to 80,000).
ORGANIZING EEOC, supra note 36, at xi. The report was part of the EEOC’s139
restructuring plan and strategic human capital plan required by the President’s Management
Agenda and directives issued by the Office of Personnel Management and Office of Management
and Budget. Id. The President maintains report cards of federal agencies at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/index.html, and you can view the EEOC’s most
recent report card summary at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/summary/10003914.2006.html with details at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/detail/10003914.2006.html.
ORGANIZING EEOC, supra note 36, at xi, xii.140
Id. at xi. The NAPA panel also recommended mobile units and dispersed staff to141
spread services more broadly. Id. at xii, xiii-xvi.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-10, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT142
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION: ACTIONS TAKEN, BUT AGENCY RESTRUCTURING EFFORTS COULD
BENEFIT FROM A MORE SYSTEMATIC CONSIDERATION OF ADVISORY PANEL'S
RECOMMENDATIONS (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0610.pdf.
JOB PERFORMANCE SYSTEMS, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE NATIONAL143
CONTACT CENTER: AN EVALUATION OF ITS IMPACTS (2006).
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all five commissioners from 1997 to 2004, and without a general counsel from 2000 to 2003.137
And as mentioned above, out of about 76,000 private sector charges, the EEOC can file suit in
only about 370 cases.  138
Although the EEOC has worked in the past few years to modify its processes and
maximize its efforts, it has not reached its goal. In 2003, a panel of the National Academy of
Public Administration (NAPA panel) issued a report, prepared at the request of the EEOC, giving
recommendations on how best to structure the EEOC and use its human capital.  The NAPA139
panel recommended changes in organizational structure, budget alignment, use of technology,
management of human capital, and management of performance.  The changes urged most140
strenuously by the NAPA panel were a national call center and a system for filing charges
electronically.  The EEOC has created its “National Contact Center,” but was criticized by the141
Government Accountability Office for not adequately considering all of the NAPA panel’s
recommendations.  The National Contact Center was created as a pilot project in 2005, and the142
Office of the Inspector General reported a year later that while there had been advancements, the
National Contact Center was ineffective and would remain so without significant changes.  143
TEN-YEAR CHECKUP, supra note 47, at iii (directing this critique at all of the agencies).144
Some of the impetus for the EEOC’s current assessments may be the Presidential Management
Agenda discussed supra note 117. That report card measures efficiencies and cost effectiveness
by the duration of proceedings and the use of interpretive regulations as a substitute for
individual contact, in part. See EXPECTMORE.GOV, DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION ASSESSMENT, at questions/answers 3.RG4 and 4.3
(2006), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/detail/10003914.2006.html.
Id.145
ExpectMore.gov, Detailed Information on the Equal Employment Opportunity146
Commission Assessment, at Question/Answer 2.5, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/detail/10003914.2006.html (last visited Feb. 28,
2008).
Nielsen, Nelson, & Lancaster, supra note 99, at 19-20, 28-30, 33; see also Michelle A.147
Travis, Susan Bisom-Rapp, E. Patrick McDermott, Michael Z. Green, & Jean R. Sternlight,
Dispute Resolution in Action: Examining the Reality of Employment Discrimination Cases:
Proceedings of the 2007 Annual Meeting, Association of American Law Schools, Sections on
Employment Discrimination and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J.
139, 147-48 (2007) (describing the EEOC’s priority system).
E. PATRICK MCDERMOTT ET AL., EEOC ORDER NO. 9/0900/7632/2, AN EVALUATION148
OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION MEDIATION PROGRAM (2000),
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Another weakness with the EEOC has been its “focus on process and not mission-
oriented factors to measure progress.”  As the United States Civil Rights Commission reported144
to Congress, “[f]ederal civil rights enforcement, to evaluate effectiveness, must also formally
assess agency progress toward discrimination reduction, the government’s overarching goal.”145
Simply counting the number of charges resolved and measuring the speed of that resolution does
not assess progress towards that qualitative goal. Related to that criticism, the EEOC does not
evaluate the performance of state Fair Employment Practices Agencies at all, only collecting
information on the number of charges handled by those agencies.146
Perhaps even more disconcerting, the EEOC does not seem to have more expertise than
courts or the litigants themselves to evaluate claims of discrimination or predict the likely
outcomes. The study by Nielsen, Nelson, and Lancaster, found that the EEOC’s priority codes,
the system created to manage the charges it received so that the charges most likely to result in a
finding that there was cause to believe discrimination had occurred, did not predict case
outcomes in federal court.147
The news concerning the EEOC is not all negative. Participants in its mediation programs
have been very satisfied with those programs.  Employers, though, have been less willing to use148
available at <http://www.eeoc.gov/mediate/report/index.html>; E. PATRICK MCDERMOTT ET AL.,
ORDER NO. 9/0900/7623/G, THE EEOC MEDIATION PROGRAM: MEDIATORS’ PERSPECTIVE ON
THE PARTIES, PROCESSES, AND OUTCOMES (2001), available at
<http://www.eeoc.gov/mediate/mcdfinal.html>.
E. PATRICK MCDERMOTT ET AL., AN INVESTIGATION OF THE REASONS FOR THE LACK149
OF EMPLOYER PARTICIPATION IN THE EEOC MEDIATION PROGRAM, available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/mediate/study3/index.html.
Nielsen, Nelson, & Lancaster, supra note 99, at 22, tbl. 1.150
42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b) (2000).151
42 U.S.C. 2000e-8(e) (2000).152
FED. R. EVID. 408.153
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the EEOC’s mediation processes because they see nothing to be gained; they view the charges as
meritless and fear nothing from the EEOC investigation.  Additionally, where the EEOC does149
institute litigation, that litigation is likely to result in a win or a successful settlement.150
Despite the satisfaction of the participants in the EEOC’s mediation program, this
program and the rest of the EEOC’s processes contribute to the secrecy effect. Rather than
enhancing transparency or making public the state of the American workplace, the EEOC’s
processes are kept confidential by law unless and until the EEOC brings an enforcement action.
Nothing said or done during and as a part of [conciliation] may be made public by
the Commission, its officers or employees, or used as evidence in a subsequent
proceeding without the written consent of the persons concerned. Any person who
makes public information in violation of this subsection shall be fined not more
than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.151
. . .
It shall be unlawful for any officer or employee of the Commission to make public
in any manner whatever any information obtained by the Commission pursuant to
its authority under this section prior to the institution of any proceeding under this
subchapter involving such information.152
These confidentiality proceedings make some sense during an investigatory phase and are
in accord with the principles governing mediation generally. Federal Rule of Evidence 408
makes information about or gained through settlement negotiations or mediation inadmissable.153
And parties routinely sign agreements to keep the information revealed through the course of the
EDWARD BRUNET ET AL., ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ADVOCATE’S154
PERSPECTIVE CASES AND MATERIALS 276 (3d ed. 2006).
Belton, supra note 5, at 913-14.155
Id. at 914 (quoting Timothy Lionel Jenkins, A Study of Federal Effort to End Job Bias:156
A History, a Status Report, and a Prognosis, 14 HOW. L.J. 259, 279 (1968) and citing Hearings
on S. 773, S. 2210, and S. 1937 Before the Subcomm. on Employment and Manpower of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 228-29, 240 (1963) and
Herbert Hill, Twenty Years of State Fair Employment Practice Commissions: A Critical Analysis
with Recommendations, 14 BUFFALO L. REV. 22, 38 (1964)).
29 C.F.R. Parts 1602, 1610, 1627, and 1630 (2007).157
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mediation confidential.154
This lack of transparency in EEOC proceedings has roots in philosophies governing state
fair employment practices commissions established prior to Title VII.  Many were “‘committed155
to human relations rather than civil rights’” and as a result, “‘believed in education, dialogue,
reconciliation and conciliation as the methods for resolving the basic problem of employment
bias’ . . . conducted in private, without the threat of sanctions and without objective standards for
compliance.”  This emphasis on human relations and secrecy prevailed in the original powers156
of the EEOC to conciliate complaints and it remains in the EEOC’s current emphasis on
conciliation and mediation.
Finally, even though the EEOC’s regulations mandate that employers of 100 or more
employees file yearly statistical reports, information from them, along with information about the
EEOC’s processes, is available only through Freedom of Information Act Requests.  Thus,157
rather than create transparency and accountability, the EEOC’s processes contribute to the
secrecy about the state of our workplaces and whether we are reaching our goal of equality.
IV. INITIAL PROPOSAL
The lack of transparency and the lack of accountability caused by the EEOC’s limitations
and the difficulties with relying on private parties as primary enforcers are substantial obstacles
to achieving workplace equality. The responsibility for enforcing Title VII at least in the private
sector should be taken away from the EEOC and vested in a new agency with a substantially
different model, one that better uses the tools of transitional justice.
Although the issue has not been cast in these terms, Title VII, and the use of litigation to
enforce it, is an attempt at transitional justice. In this country we used the law and the power of
the state to enslave people based on race, and to restrict the political, civil, and economic rights
of people based on race, sex, religion, and national origin. Reconstruction began the
BLUMROSEN, supra note 60, at 4 (arguing that “the effort to ameliorate long standing158
patterns of race and sex subordination [through Title VII] is perhaps the most ambitious social
reform effort ever undertaken in America” (emphasis in original)); David L. Rose, Twenty-Five
Years Later: Where Do We Stand on Equal Employment Opportunity Enforcement, 42 VAND. L.
REV. 1121, 1129 (1989) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 16 (1964)).
The House Report that Rose cited noted specifically that “[t]oday, more than 100 years after their
formal emancipation, Negroes . . . are by virtue of one or another type of discrimination not
accorded the rights, privileges, and opportunities which are . . . the birthright of all citizens.”
H.R. Rep. No. 914, at 18; see generally OWEN FISS, THE LAW AS IT COULD BE (2003) (arguing
that the courts are the only entities able to counteract the power of corporations and also of
bureaucracy in other government institutions and that judges both can and must give content to
the equality norm).
For a discussion of this evolution in the context of race, see MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM
JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY
426, 432, 435-36, 441 (2004) (arguing that the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 were a reaction by the public to end the violent oppression of Blacks);
Robert D. Loevy, Chapter I: Introduction the Background and Setting of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, in THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: THE PASSAGE OF THE LAW THAT ENDED RACIAL
SEGREGATION 1, 1-42 (Robert D. Loevy ed., 1997) (describing the evolution of U.S. policy from
slavery to the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
The intent of Congress to transform the way that women were treated is not quite as clear.
Title VII was originally drafted to prohibit discrimination on the bases of race, color, national
origin, and religion, and as a last-minute amendment by a Southern Democrat, proposed, some
say, as a means to defeat the bill, sex was added to the list of prohibited classifications. 110
Cong. Rec. 2577-84 (1964), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII & IX OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 3213-28 (undated); see also RAYMOND F. GREGORY, WOMEN AND
WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION: OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO GENDER EQUALITY 23-27 (2003)
(describing the overt discrimination of women in employment and the evolution to Title VII, but
implying that banning discrimination on the basis of sex was not really the goal of the statute).
Even though the proponent thought that the inclusion of sex would defeat the bill, Representative
Martha Griffiths (D. Mich.) urged liberal groups to support the amendment, reasoning that some
conservatives would vote for it because of its proponent, and she could persuade other members
of Congress to join in; thus Title VII may indeed have been intended to transform how society
treated women. MARY FRANCES BERRY, WHY ERA FAILED: POLITICS, WOMEN’S RIGHTS, AND
THE AMENDING PROCESS OF THE CONSTITUTION 61 (1988); see also Jo Freeman, How “Sex” Got
into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a Maker of Public Policy, 9 LAW & INEQUALITY 163
(1991).
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transformation from that system to one more legitimate: the country first abolished slavery and
then much more slowly removed the laws that limited rights. The third step, which really did not
begin in earnest until the middle of the twentieth century, involved prohibiting private actors
from depriving others of access to benefits like jobs, housing, goods, and services. Title VII was
part of this third step.158
Witherspoon, supra note 4, at 1171.159
See PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: FACING THE CHALLENGE OF TRUTH160
COMMISSIONS 11 (2002).
See id. at 12-13 (describing how frequently those losing power negotiate amnesty for161
their past acts, the lack of judicial infrastructure in countries undergoing such a transition, and the
large numbers of accused perpetrators which even an established judicial system would have
trouble handling).
Id. at 5.162
Id. at 7-8 (documenting both the broad disappointment many experience and the163
surprising reforms and restitution that has resulted after some)
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The goal of employment discrimination laws in the U.S. has been social change,
imposing a new norm that existed but was not universal.  The establishment of this norm was a159
large step taken to fundamentally transform society, part of the move from a repressive regime,
one that actively subordinated some groups, to a new society with greater legitimacy. That
transition is not yet complete. Despite the fact that the country has been in the process of
transition for years, neither lawmakers nor scholars have approached the problem of employment
discrimination as a problem of transitional justice.
Transitional justice is a way to move from a repressive political system (or war) to a more
democratic and legitimate system (or peace),  and one of its tools is adjudication, an adversarial160
process with two parties with a stake in the outcome presenting a case to a neutral decisionmaker
for a binding determination. When, during the former regime, actors violated laws in place at the
time they acted, adjudication can be a useful means to justice, if it vindicates the victims and
appropriately punishes the actors. Trials also signal that the government is working to reform the
system, adding to the condemnation of the bad acts of the prior regime and legitimizing the new
government. Sometimes, however, adjudication is not feasible. For example, the judicial
infrastructure may be too broken, or sanctions may not be possible. And in those instances, a
different tool of transitional justice may be useful: the truth commission.161
A truth commission is an official body set up usually by a government or international
organization to investigate and report on a pattern of past human rights abuses.  Truth162
commissions have been used in many countries, with some positive and some negative results.163
There is no single model for a truth commission, and in fact part of its strength is that a truth
commission is designed with the particular needs of the culture in mind. But truth commissions
have shared some similarities. A truth commission takes evidence, and makes a public record of
people’s stories, issuing a report. It does not impose sanctions itself, but it often makes
recommendations for reform. Sometimes the process includes an amnesty for the perpetrators of
abuse in return for their testimony.
James P. Smith & Finis Welch, Affirmative Action and Labor Markets, 2 J. LAB. ECON.164
269 (1984); James P. Smith & Finis R. Welch, Black Economic Progress after Myrdal, 27 J.
ECON. LIT. 519 (1989).
See Kevin Stainback, Corre L. Robinson, & Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, Race and165
Workplace Integration: A Politically Mediated Process?, 48 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 1200, 1204 (2005)
(concluding this and citing a number of other studies supporting the politically mediated
hypothesis).
Id. at 1207-08.166
Id. at 1217-23.167
Id. at 1222.168
Orly Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory and Industrial Relations: The Governance of169
Workplace Safety, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1071 (2005). But see Kalev et al., supra note 6 (finding
that employer actions in the absence of strict accountability standards were ineffective at creating
or maintaining diversity); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look
at Regulatory Negotiation, 43 DUKE L.J. 1206 (1994) (arguing that traditional incentives created
by powerful outsiders, Congress and the administrative agency are preferable to regulations
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A modified version of this approach to enforce our employment discrimination laws is
warranted for several reasons. Our current system is solely adversarial and relies primarily on
private enforcement as described above. But adjudication alone has not created the change
intended by the law. An agency to promote public values could complement the system of
adjudication and come closer to accomplishing the transition than our current system alone.
A strong federal role in enforcement is necessary to produce real change. Although some
social science research suggests that federal civil rights legislation does not enhance workplace
equality,  the majority of the research suggests that workplace equality is politically mediated,164
that is that political institutions are largely responsible for changes in workplace inequality.165
Enactment of civil rights laws shapes the way that employers manage their regulatory
environment, and the management of this environment is accomplished through interaction with
federal regulatory bodies and through the courts.  Kevin Stainback, Corre Robinson, and166
Donald Tomaskovic-Devey demonstrated in a recent study a strong positive correlation between
resources devoted to the enforcement of the antidiscrimination laws and workplace integration.167
One of the most important findings of that study was that the law did not produce change in
employer behavior unless it was accompanied by significant enforcement, which included both
findings that the law had been broken and some sanction imposed; declines in enforcement
meant a stalling of improvements in integration.  Recent literature on new governance further168
supports these findings. New governance promotes harnessing institutional culture to promote
real change, but that governance must occur in the shadow of the law to make change.169
negotiated).
E.g. Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural170
Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 91 (2003); Linda Hamilton
Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and
Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id,
the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317
(1987);  Ann C. McGinley, ¡Viva la Évoluciòn!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 415, 418, 426-27 (2000); Marc Poirier, Is Cognitive Bias at Work a
Dangerous Condition on Land?, 7 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 459 (analogizing liability for
discrimination caused by cognitive bias to the law related to dangerous conditions on land);
Michael Selmi, Discrimination as Accident: Old Whine, New Bottle, 74 IND. L.J. 1233 (1999);
Susan Sturm, Second Generation Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
458, 467-68 (2001); Joan Williams, The Social Psychology of Stereotyping: Using Social Science
to Litigate Gender Discrimination Cases and Defang the "Cluelessness" Defense, 7 EMPLOYEE
RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 401 (2003).
Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).171
Supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.172
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Second, although this is not a feature of truth commissions, an agency can be developed
to harness expertise in the field. In addition to the usual cadre of lawyers, the agency might be
staffed with social science experts like cognitive psychologists, sociologists specializing in
organizational behavior, and economists. One of the principal critiques of our current
employment discrimination jurisprudence is that discrimination is difficult to detect and that
expert testimony is needed to decode behaviors.  These experts would help untangle what are170
very complicated issues, but also would help direct public policy that was grounded in solid
research.
Third, the public is served not only by increased equality that enforcement will bring, but
also by the norm developing function of a public presence in identifying violations of norms and
condemning those violations. Having the state serve this role is necessary for justice–it is the
only way to involve the public and ensure that the values embodied in authoritative texts (statutes
and Constitution) are given force (reality made to conform with them).  Moreover, having an171
authoritative voice give greater content to the meaning of discrimination and how it is
accomplished will help employers avoid liability and will harness their ability to promote
substantive equality.
Fourth, private enforcement alone, as demonstrated above, cannot provide enough
enforcement to create equality.  And related to that, a fact-finding body that publicizes its172
processes will enhance transparency, which is a necessary precondition to accountability, but
which is also a good in its own right. Transparency will enhance the ability of the market to assist
E.g. Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30173
COLUM. HUMAN RTS. L. REV. 29, 59-60 (1998) (comparing claims brought by managers to those
sought by rank and file employees, noting that only 10% of those who get a right to sue letter
succeed in filing a civil complaint and only 7.5% of those who get a right to sue letter are
successful in retaining an attorney).
Lee Reeves, Pragmatism over Politics: Recent Trends in Lower Court Employment174
Discrimination Jurisprudence (2007) (unpublished manuscript on file with author), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1024632.
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in preventing discrimination. We treat the employment relationship as a contractual one and treat
both parties to the contract, employer and employee, as equals. But there are very serious
information asymmetries when it comes to information about discrimination. Employers have a
monopoly on information about allegations of discrimination and about the wages and terms and
conditions of work employees in the aggregate. Having a public record of past behavior will
empower employees to make better decisions about what cultures they are willing to work in and
what wages they are willing to accept.
Finally, a federal agency that performs some sort of adjudication can provide greater
access to justice for employees and small employers and stronger enforcement than relying on the
court system or ADR alone. Rank and file employees lack access to the courts because they
cannot find attorneys to take their cases, in part because the cases are so difficult to win.173
Federal agencies are usually created to harness the skills of those with special expertise in an area
and to provide for cost-effective enforcement. Both of those things would benefit those regulated
and also the court system. And employment discrimination law is a specialized area, requiring
understanding of human behavior and of economic policies. Just moving these cases from the
court system to a federal agency would benefit litigants and the public. Recent research suggests
that one of the reasons that so many hurdles for employment discrimination plaintiffs have been
raised is that courts perceive themselves to be overworked in these cases.  And an agency that174
publicizes its proceedings will not cause the secrecy problems that ADR methods do.
The details of possible agency functions, like whether the agency has exclusive initial
jurisdiction over all employment claims, how class claims might be handled, exactly what
processes should be included, and what sanctions the agency could implement, are a topic for
future articles. 
These questions are particularly challenging. On the one hand, if employees have a choice
about whether to go to the agency at all, the agency is not likely to have any effect. Employers
could require employees to waive their rights to go to the agency as a condition of employment
or could require that in exchange for severance at termination. Employers would have greater
incentive to settle potential claims earlier, and employees would have an incentive to accept the
settlements rather than risk no recovery. That would not be a bad outcome for the individual
employees, but the public interest would not necessarily be served if employer behavior was not
See CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (allowing a common law counterclaim to be175
brought in an adjudication by a federal agency where the parties waived the right to an article III
court and power did not encroach too seriously on the work of article III courts).
See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global176
Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 15 (2005) (describing the importance of
transparency for optimal administrative agencies); Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Administrative Law:
A Model for Global Adminisitrative Law?, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (2005).
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otherwise changed. On the other hand, if employees are forced to use the agency’s processes
only, their rights may be frustrated by bureaucratic incompetence, delay, or agency capture. The
public interest, too, may be subverted by these things or even by simple lack of funding, like that
which plagues the EEOC currently or even worse, like that which plagues the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration.
In terms of the agency’s processes or sanctions, several important considerations will
have to be explored. It might be desirable for the agency to adjudicate claims of discrimination.
The expertise and relative inexpense of agency proceedings would mean that claims would have
better outcomes and that more people would have access to a neutral forum to make a claim. At
the same time, it is not clear that a federal agency can adjudicate claims between two private
parties at least without their consent.  In light of this and other concerns, it might instead be175
better for the agency to find facts and issue an order that is not self enforcing but which can be
enforced in federal court if the employer does not comply, like for the National Labor Relations
Board. A system of graduated penalties might be instituted if the employer did not comply
without resort to court enforcement. Sanctions short of self-enforcing orders, however, may not
create enough accountability to create real change.
These difficult questions aside for now, I will outline just briefly the components the
agency must have. 
First, the agency’s processes and findings must be public.  There are good reasons that176
investigations need to be confidential at times, mostly to prevent the subject of the investigation
from being able to hide wrongdoing more effectively armed with knowledge of the process and
findings of an investigation. However, some pieces of information, like the fact that a charge has
been filed against a particular employer, should immediately become public information, absent a
strong reason for confidentiality. 
Second, the reporting requirements of the current system should remain, but should be
extended to smaller employers. Additionally, the agency should have to make that information
public at the very least in the aggregate, and preferably with all details intact. In other words, the
public should have access to the diversity demographics of the country’s larger employers.
Transparency for this information will allow private parties to better assess the employer’s
culture and will also provide another form of accountability for the federal agency. If the agency
Ian Ayres & Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Mark(et)ing Nondiscrimination: Privatizing177
ENDA with a Certification Mark, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1639 (2006); Ian Ayres & Jennifer Gerarda
Brown, Privatizing Employment Protections, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 587 (2007).
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fails to investigate persistent suspicious employment practices, members of the public can
discover that failure and pressure the agency to investigate.
Third, the agency must possess independent investigatory and “prosecutorial” powers,
just as the EEOC does now, but broader. For all of the reasons that it is risky for employees to
come forward with information about potential discrimination, some practices simply cannot be
challenged easily by private parties. And the agency investigation and publicizing power should
be employer-wide, not simply limited to the allegations that an individual employee may have
brought to the agency. In other words, a charge of discrimination simply sets in motion an
investigation of the employer’s practices towards all of its employees. But an investigation
should not require a charge at all to investigate an employer or industry. Reporting requirements,
like those currently required but reaching to smaller employers, could provide the data that would
raise a suspicion of discrimination.
Fourth, the agency must have the power to issue interpretive regulations, binding on
employers and employees. “Discrimination” is illegal, but what practices constitute
discrimination are the subject of serious debate. Regulations developed by experts will help give
content to this norm. Fifth, the agency must have create some additional incentive to comply with
what it identifies as best practices. Some kind of branding or approval rating, like that suggested
by Ian Ayres and Jennifer Gerarda Brown  would help remedy the information assymetries in177
the labor market. 
Fifth, the agency must engage in outreach to both employers and employees to inform
people of their rights and obligations. Some of that outreach will be accomplished simply by
more information being made public. 
Sixth, the personnel of the agency must be balanced by political party, like many
agencies, but also by background. An agency dominated either by management or by those with a
labor-side background will be unable to avoid agency capture. Moreover, the best way to ensure
that the agency serves the needs of the people whose rights it works to protect is to include those
people in the planning of the agency design.
Finally, whatever form the agency takes, it cannot supplant the current system entirely.
Litigation by private parties, though inadequate, is still an important avenue for relief, an
important outlet for employee voice, and an important check on government inaction and
employer power. 
To be sure, creating a new agency and giving it these functions faces substantial
obstacles. If the EEOC has never been fully funded, there is nothing to suggest that an agency
Stainback, Robinson & Tomaskovic-Devey, supra note 141 (reporting that progress has178
stalled); Hymowitz, supra note 1 (reporting losses).
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with broader powers would be either. And if employers believe that they benefit from the current
system by not being penalized for discrimination, they will lobby against any change. It will take
significant political will to overcome this lobbying, and the continuing lack of consensus on the
antidiscrimination norm suggests that enough political will would be difficult to marshal. These
obstacles are not insurmountable, however, and this paper and those that will follow are efforts
toward that goal. 
V. CONCLUSION
Our system of enforcement of employment discrimination laws is broken, and more or
different positive law will change this reality little. That positive law has to be interpreted by
courts to have effect, and courts all too often interpret the law to keep employment
discrimination cases out of court. Whether that is caused by the judges’ implicit biases, distaste
for the subject matter, or sense of being overworked, the end result is the same. Progress on
workplace equality has stalled, and our focus on litigation is not likely to resolve that. The EEOC
as it currently functions is also unable to resolve our lack of progress. The structure of the
agency, its functions, and its lack of funding all serve to make the agency ineffective at creating
systemwide change.
It has been more than two generations since Title VII was first enacted. Although
progress towards equality was made, that progress stalled in the mid 1980s, and there are even
reports that we are starting to move backwards.  A generation without progress ought to be178
enough to warrant a new approach.
